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Contract theory is a much-debated topic. Atiyah, for example, wrote about how contract
law has developed over the past three centuries, arguing that we have seen ‘the rise and
fall of contracts’.1 Even more radical is Gilmore who, in his ominously titled book, The
Death of Contract, stressed the artificiality of contract law.2 There is a general lack of
consensus regarding contract theory, partly owing to country-specific differences, as
well as to different methods and theories being used to explain contracts. When consid-
ering Life Time Contracts, however, one cannot feel other than uneasy about the current
state of affairs, where all contracts are forcibly modelled to fit the ‘ideal type’ of contract,
with its emphasis on the principles of consent, freedom of contract, and pacta sunt ser-
vanda. This applies especially in the case of Life Time Contracts, which tend to be long-
term and relate to people’s fundamental needs and wants. However, any alternatives to
these principles are currently absent in the case of such contracts.
Dutch contract law is based on three general principles derived from classical law
theory: consent, freedom of contract, and pacta sunt servanda. These general principles
were developed to regulate short-term contracts, such as sales contracts. In practice, how-
ever, they are applied to all types of contracts. Provisions dealing with long-term con-
tracts – such as employment contracts and tenancy agreements – are considered to be
mere exceptions to these general principles, which focus mainly on the relationships
between parties at the moment they enter into the contract, rather than on how these
relationships may develop over time. Applying these principles to long-term contracts is
thus, problematic as it neglects the evolving character of parties’ relationships. Given that
a long-term contract can last for 30 years or more, it is doubtful that emphasizing on the
moment when the parties originally entered into the contract does justice to its long
duration. To remedy this deficiency, more attention must be paid to the parties’ relation-
ships throughout the duration of a long-term contract. In long-term relational contracts,
* Lecturer/researcher at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
I would like to thank Prof. M.V. Antokolskaia and V.S. Parfenchyk for their valuable comments on a draft
version of this article. Any errors are mine.
1 P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979.
2 G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, OH, 1974.
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the personal relationship between the parties is often more important to them than their
contractual relationship. And, in order to fully understand the contractual relationship in
a long-term contract, it is necessary to look at behavioural norms.
This chapter first discusses the problems that arise when applying general principles
of contract law to the way in which long-term contracts are regulated and then presents
an alternative approach – ‘Relational Contract Theory’ (RCT) – that focuses on the par-
ties’ relationship during the term of the contract. The case study chosen for this purpose
examines two social long-term contracts:3 prenuptial agreements and residential tenancy
agreements.4 I will argue that the three general principles of contract law are ill suited to
regulate these types of long-term contracts and that more attention should be paid to the
parties’ evolving relationship. This is a more suitable approach, given the RCT’s focus on
the parties’ relationship, rather than on the ‘black and white’ letter of the contract itself.
The RCT recognizes that every relationship is guided by behavioural norms. These
behavioural norms continue to influence the parties long after the contract has been
entered into, guiding how those parties interact, regardless of their formal contractual
rights and duties. I will argue that the emphasis on long-term relational contracts should
be on the relational dimension and the norms that stem from that relationship during the
term of the particular contract. Specifically, I argue in favour of applying the RCT, which
conforms to Point 6 of the European Social Contracts Group Declaration (‘EuSoCo De-
claration’), which states that the law “should be able to cope with long-term relational
problems of changes in human lives instead of providing only remedies typical of spot
contracts.”5
The first section discusses the three principles of contracts law and explores the pro-
blem of applying them to long-terms contracts, particularly the fact that they give long-
term contracts a too-static character. The second section presents the RCT as an alter-
native way of viewing long-term contracts and as a solution to the problems presented by
current contract law. The third section focuses on prenuptial and tenancy agreements,
analysing them from an RCT perspective and assessing the extent to which they are in
conformity with the RCT.
3 Social long-term contracts are defined as “long-term social relationships providing goods, services and
opportunities for work and income-creation, which are essential for the self-realisation of individuals and
their participation in society at various stages in their life”. See Principle 1, ‘Principles of Social Long-term
Contracts’, in L. Nogler & U. Reifner (Eds.), Life Time Contracts: Social Long-term Contracts in Labour,
Tenancy and Consumer Credit Law, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2014, p. 5.
4 This chapter will only focus on residential tenancy agreements, commercial tenancy agreements are ex-
cluded.
5 Nogler & Reifner (Eds.), supra note 3, p. 22.
164
Alexander Flos
8.2 Three General Principles of Contract Law
Three principles of contract law – consent, freedom of contract, and pacta sunt servanda
– are commonly perceived as general principles of Dutch contract law.6 These principles
cover the various stages of a contract. The principle of consent is most important when
the contract is being entered into, while the principle of the freedom of contract mainly
relates to the contents of the contract, and pacta sunt servanda governs the final stage of
the contract. Although these three principles were conceived of with short-term or synal-
lagmatic spot contracts, such as sales contracts, in mind, and they have become general
principles applying to all contracts and they form the basis of Dutch contract law. How-
ever, these general principles are not as general as they may suggest because they do not
apply equally to all contracts. As will be explained below, the application of these princi-
ples to long-term contracts can be particularly problematic.
8.2.1 Consent
For a contract to be valid, the only requirement needed to satisfy the principle of consent
is the parties’ mutual agreement. No other requirements, such as a requirement for the
contract to be in writing, have to be met for the contract to be considered valid. The most
important element in this mutual agreement is the will of the parties, which can be ex-
pressed verbally, either orally or in writing, or non-verbally. Dutch contract law codifies
this principle in Article 217, Book 6 Dutch Civil Code (DCC), which states that only ‘an
offer and its acceptance’ are required for the conclusion of a valid contract. Under Article
37, Book 3 DCC, such declarations can be made in any form. The moment at which the
parties reach mutual agreement is the moment at which the contract is seen as being
concluded. However, there are several exceptions to this general rule.
The most important exception to this principle relates to contracts that are required
by law to be in a specific form, such as in writing or in the form of a notarial deed. A
contract that fails to comply with the legally required form is void. Article 2, Book 7 DCC
states, for example, that a contract for selling a house must be in writing, while Article
115, Book 1 DCC states that prenuptial agreements must be recorded in a notarial deed.
Formal requirements for entering into contracts are usually intended to protect the inter-
ests of one or both of the parties to the contract and, sometimes, even those of third
parties. Most importantly, the requirement of a written contract forces parties to specify
their agreements, and so does not allow scope for any unexpressed expectations of the
6 J.H.M. van Erp, Contract als rechtsbetrekking. Een rechtsvergelijkende studie, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle,
1990, p. 10; T. Hartlief, ‘Vrijheid en bescherming in het contractenrecht’, Contracteren: tijdschrift voor de
contractspraktijk 2003, p. 5; J.M. Smits, ‘Eenheid en verscheidenheid in het contractenrecht. Over het gede-
termineerd verleden en de postmoderne toekomst van het privaatrecht’, Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 1998,
p. 13.
165
8 Prenuptial and Tenancy Agreements as Relational Contracts
parties, as opposed to hard and fast agreements, also to become part of the contract. This
also means that no implicit agreements or implicit changes in the original agreement can
be assumed unless they are recorded in writing. All of these factors add even more weight
to the importance of the written contract.
8.2.2 Freedom of Contract
The second principle in Dutch contract law is the freedom of contract, which means that
parties are free to decide whether to enter into a contract and free to determine its con-
tents. In general, parties are free to shape their contractual relations as they see fit. Under
the principle of consent, parties need to agree on all aspects of their contract when they
enter into it, because that is when the contract is seen as being concluded. In its classical
form, the principle of the freedom of contract reflects that the parties have autonomy
when deciding to enter into a contract.
However, this freedom is not unlimited. Certain types of contracts, for example, in-
clude provisions to protect the weaker party. In theory, the general principle of the free-
dom of contract in Dutch law also applies to employment contracts and tenancy agree-
ments. In practice, however, their application is limited by the specific provisions
governing these types of contracts, which are specifically designed to protect the employ-
ee or tenant. Dutch contract law has also developed over the years and now places more
emphasis on solidarity, thereby, forcing parties to take account of the other contractual
party’s interests.7 This explains why legal provisions have been introduced to require
contracting parties to provide certain information to each other or to protect the interests
of the other party. A bank, for example, has to actively warn its customers of the risks of
investing in shares. These obligations are based on the general provision of Article 2,
Book 6 DCC, which obliges contracting parties to act towards each other in accordance
with the requirements of reasonableness and fairness.
The interpretation of contracts also curbs parties’ freedom of contract. If parties later
disagree on what their contract means, the contract has to be interpreted by a court. The
fact that a disagreement has arisen suggests that the parties never reached full, mutual
agreement. However, they will be bound by the court’s interpretation of their contract.
Contract law also provides default rules to fill any minor gaps in the contents of a con-
tract. These default rules are legitimized by the assumption that the parties have impli-
citly agreed to the missing terms. In reality, however, they represent another exception to
the principle of the freedom of contract as the parties never actually reached agreement
on those missing terms.
In addition, it is not only the law that curbs the freedom of contract: parties are not
always able to foresee all possible eventualities when entering into a contract. This can
7 Hartlief, supra note 6, p. 6.
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make the freedom of contract illusory, especially in the case of long-term contracts. This
is referred to as ‘bounded rationality’, whereby parties cannot foresee or contemplate, at
the time of contracting, all the possibilities that may arise and how their relationship will
evolve, especially in the case of long-term contracts.8 Yet, the law requires parties to cast
all the details of their contract in stone at the time they enter into it.
8.2.3 Pacta Sunt Servanda
Under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, parties are bound by a contract as soon as
they enter into it. According to pacta sunt servanda, parties cannot terminate or alter the
contract unilaterally, unless they specifically addressed that possibility at the time of con-
cluding the contract. Although the strict rules on the binding nature of contracts do not
cause problems in the case of synallagmatic spot relationships, they can cause problems
in the case of long-term contracts.
As most sales contracts are short-term contracts, there is usually little need to alter or
terminate them at an early stage. As the DCC takes sales contracts to be typical of all
contracts, the only opportunity it provides for early termination of a contract is when
there is a problem with performance on the part of one or both parties. If one party’s
performance is inadequate, the other party has a statutory right to terminate the contract
(rescission; Article 265, Book 6 DCC). Under the influence of EU law, consumers now
also have the right to unilaterally terminate a consumer sales contract within a certain
‘cool-off period’ in certain circumstances.
In the case of long-term contracts, however, strict application of the principle of pacta
sunt servanda can be problematic. The only remedies that Dutch law provides for a party
wishing to alter or terminate such a contract is the option to invoke the general provisions
on reasonableness and fairness (Article 248(2), Book 6 DCC) or to invoke an unforeseen
change of circumstances (Article 258, Book 6 DCC). However, both these remedies have a
relatively limited scope of application. Contract provisions can be set aside by a court if they
go against the requirements of reasonableness and fairness. A contract can also be altered
or terminated if the circumstances have changed to such an extent that the petitioner
cannot reasonably be expected to remain bound by the contract in its original form. How-
ever, this does not give much flexibility to change or terminate a long-term contract uni-
laterally if parties cannot reach mutual agreement. The Dutch Supreme Court has, there-
fore, ruled that a long-term contract entered into for an unspecified period can be
terminated unilaterally even if the DCC does not make any provision for this.9
8 A. Sanders, Statischer Vertrag und dynamische Vertragsbeziehung: Wirksamkeits- und Ausübungskontrolle
von Gesellschafts- und Eheverträgen, Verlag Ernst und Werner Gieseking, Bielefeld, 2008, p. 314.
9 See the Dutch Supreme Court ruling: 28 October 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BQ9854, Nederlandse Jurispru-
dentie 2012, p. 685 (Ronde Venen/Stedin).
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8.2.4 Concluding Remarks
Parties who enter into a contract through which they intend to cooperate for a long
period of time are obliged to be flexible. They must be prepared to adjust the contract
in light of changes in circumstances or to subsequently tie off issues that were left open or
were unforeseen at the time the parties entered into the contract. The decisions that that
parties make when they enter into a contract can be limited by bounded rationality (i.e.,
information, time, and knowledge). When entering into a long-term contract, parties
cannot possibly know how their business or other contractual relationships will develop
over time. The same is true for future external developments that can affect contractual
relationships. All this argues in favour of allowing more flexibility to alter or terminate
long-term contracts, including, if necessary, unilaterally. Applying the above-mentioned
general principles of contract law to long-term contracts identifies the moment when the
contract is concluded as the moment when all of the parties’ future rights and obligations
are fixed. However, such an emphasis on the moment at which the contract is concluded
gives the contract a static character because, from that point onwards, everything be-
comes cast in stone, potentially for years to come. This is not a problem for short-term
contracts, such as the ‘spot’ sales contract entered into when someone buys a newspaper
at a local shop on the spot. In the case of long-term contracts, however, which may last as
long as the marriage or until the death of a party, the rigidity of these principles results in
potentially detrimental inflexibility.10
True, contract law offers little scope for flexibility. However, parties can remedy this
shortcoming by incorporating provisions into their contracts that allow them to alter or
renegotiate contractual terms in the future. Without such provisions, problems are likely
to emerge, particularly when one of the parties is unwilling to cooperate. In addition, the
behaviour of parties to a long-term contract differs from the behaviour of parties to a
sales contract; the former are more inclined to cooperate, be flexible, and take the interest
of the other party into consideration, because they value the ongoing relationship. This
behavioural aspect is lacking in current contract law as it treats all contracts as short-term
spot contracts. Therefore, it would be better to have a contract theory that takes this
difference into account and it is for this the RCT offers an alternative.
8.3 Relational Contract Theory
The RCT, as put forward by Macneil, places contracts in their societal context. In this
way, a contract is seen firstly as a means to enable rather than to determine cooperation
between the contracting parties and so is governed not only by legal rules, but also by
behavioural norms. For a clearer view of these norms, it is necessary to study the context
10 M.A. Eisenberg, ‘Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts’, 94 N.W.U. L. Rev. 2000, p. 807.
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of a contract and the relationships between the parties.11 In other words, contracts should
be seen as transactions embedded in complex relationships. To understand the transac-
tions, therefore, we must first understand the underlying relationship.12 The RCT also
makes a distinction between discrete contracts, when the relationship between the parties
is of no or less relevance, and relational contracts, when the relationship between the
parties is of defining importance. The RCT sees every contract falling somewhere along
a continuum of discrete and relational contacts. Although a short-term contract is more
likely to be a discrete contract than a relational contract, a short-term contract, too,
cannot be fully understood without understanding the relationship in which it is em-
bedded and the norms flowing from that relationship.
Macneil refers to ‘common contract norms’ that are relevant for any type of contract,
regardless of whether it is discrete or relational. However, some of those norms are more
applicable to discrete contracts, while others are better suited to relational contracts. By
contrast, the general norms of Dutch contract law tend to focus more on discrete con-
tracts, particularly those of a short-term nature.
8.3.1 The Contract
According to the RCT, a contract is a means for people to cooperate and to exchange
commodities and services. A contract has four primal roots.13 The first of these primal
roots is society.14 Parties can only understand, conclude, and perform a contract if they
have a common frame of reference; in other words, a common means of communication.
What is considered to be an offer or acceptance of a contract depends on the specific
society and its behavioural codes. In Bulgaria, for example, people nod their head to say
‘no’ and shake their head to say ‘yes’, which would lead to misunderstandings if a Bulgar-
ian were to shake his head to indicate his wish to accept an offer and enter into a contract
in the Netherlands.
The second primal root is labour specialization, which means that nobody is self-
sufficient. As a result, we are all forced to exchange goods and services with other people,
and these exchanges are made in the form of contracts.
11 In his later work, Macneil referred to the ‘Essential Contract Theory’ in order to distinguish this theory from
other Relational Contract theories. See I.R. Macneil, ‘Contracting Worlds and Essential Contract Theory’, 9
Soc. Legal Stud. 2000, p. 432.
12 I.R. Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries’, 94 N.W.U. L. Rev. 2000, p. 881.
13 I.R. Macneil, ‘Whither Contracts?’, 21 J. Legal Educ. 1969, p. 408; I.R. Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Con-
tracts’, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1974, p. 696 et seq.; I.R. Macneil, The New Social Contract: The Inquiry into Modern
Contractual Relations, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 1980, p. 1 et seq.
14 I.R. Macneil, ‘Essays on the Nature of Contract’, N.C. Cent. L.J. 1979, p. 172 et seq.
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The third root is the freedom of choice. This distinguishes contracts from other types
of exchanges, such as forced labour. People enter into a contract of their own free will and
are not forced to do so. There is thus, a difference between forced and unforced contracts.
The fourth and final primal root is the awareness of the future. Contracts always
involve an exchange in either the near or the distant future. Such an exchange is not
possible without an awareness of the future; in other words, if the parties are just living
in the ‘here and now’, they do not contemplate or plan for future needs, wants, or events.
Buying a plane ticket to go on a holiday to Greece, for example, requires making plans for
the future, even if the contract itself is entered into weeks before this.
A contract, thus, is a means for people to cooperate with each other and can be
defined as ‘relations among people who have exchanged, are exchanging, or expect to
be exchanging in the future’.15 Contract law’s function is to facilitate cooperation between
people who want to exchange particular goods or services. The rules set out in contract
law are not just directed specifically at the parties in question. They also influence the
expectations of other people, who expect the parties in question to behave in such and
such a way. In this way, contracts function as a basis for accomplishing exchanges of
goods and services and for enabling exchanges between people.
An important aspect of such cooperation is what Macneil refers to as ‘presentiation’.16
This is the act of bringing future needs into the present and acting accordingly. If people
have full presentiation at the moment they conclude a contract, they can foresee exactly
what they will need in the future. When it comes to long-term contracts, however, full
presentiation is illusory. The general principles and rules of contract law attempt to con-
tradict this reality by freezing the parties’ relationship at the moment they enter into the
contract and forcing them to behave accordingly. The principle of pacta sunt servanda,
for example, requires parties to foresee all of the possible future developments relevant to
their long-term contractual relationships at the moment they enter into the contract.17
However, this is not feasible for long-term contracts.
8.3.2 Discrete versus Relational Contracts
The RCT distinguishes between two types of contracts: discrete contracts and relational
contracts. A discrete contract is a contract for which the parties’ relationship is frequently
of little or no relevance. In general, though not always, these types of contracts tend to be
15 I.R. Macneil, ‘Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos’, 143 J.
Inst. Theo. Econ. 1987, p. 274.
16 I.R. Macneil, ‘Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation’, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1974, p. 589.
17 Macneil 1974, supra note 13, p. 802; P. Linzer, ‘Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Ap-
proach’, Ann. Surv. Am. L. 1988, p. 155-156.
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of short duration, and so cooperation between the parties is relatively limited over time.18
A relational contract, on the other hand, is typically a long-term contract, for which the
relationships between the parties are more important.19 In both cases, however, the con-
text in which the contract was entered into and the relations between the parties are
important.
An example of a discrete contract is one in which a cyclist on a holiday in another
country visits a local bicycle repair shop to have his gears fixed. This is a one-off transac-
tion, in which the relationship between the parties is less important. After entering into
and performing the contract, the parties will part ways and will most likely never see each
other again, let alone enter into a contract again. Even so, the context of the contract is
still significant. This context, which is so natural that lawyers tend to overlook it, includes
the culture of cycling, the concept of ‘money’, the legal concept of ownership of the bike,
and the social conventions that underlie the parties’ interaction.20 Even in the case of
discrete contracts, therefore, it is important not to ignore the context in which contract-
ing takes place.
There are three characteristics that distinguish discrete and relational contracts.21
Firstly, the duration of the contract is important. Buying a magazine at a newspaper kiosk
is limited in time and usually regarded as a discrete contract. This applies unless, for
example, the purchase becomes a habit and the buyer chooses to go to the same kiosk
on a regular basis. Secondly, the parties’ obligations in discrete contracts are more clearly
defined. This reflects the often-limited duration of such contracts.22 Thirdly, the parties
involved in discrete contracts are less dependent on each other as their relationship does
not normally go beyond a single transaction. These three characteristics indicate whether
a contract is of a more discrete or a more relational nature.
Here, we can already see how general contract law (being the general principles and
rules of contract law: consent, freedom of contract, and pacta sunt servanda) differs from
an RCT approach to contracts. The former, which builds upon the general principles and
rules of consent, freedom of contract, and pacta sunt servanda, tends to treat all contracts
as if they were discrete contracts, with the sales contract as a typical example. In this way,
18 Macneil 1987, supra note 15, p. 275; N.M. Crystal, ‘An Empirical View of Relational Contracts under Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code’, Ann. Surv. Am. L. 1988, p. 298; R.C. Bird, ‘Employment as a
Relational Contract’, 8 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 2005, p. 152.
19 Bird, supra note 18, p. 151.
20 I.R. Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law’, 72 N.W.U. L. Rev. 1978, p. 857, n. 10.
21 R.E. Speidel, ‘The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts’, 93 N.W.U. L. Rev 2000, p. 823 et
seq. As well as these three general basic characteristics, Speidel recognizes certain additional features that
distinguish discrete contracts from relational contracts: future cooperation is expected and can be facilitated
by mechanisms agreed by an authority, while the costs and benefits of the relationship have to be shared
instead of divided, transaction-specific investments may be made and, lastly, the personal relation between
the contracting parties comprizes an integral part of the relationship.
22 J. Goetz & R.E. Scott, ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1981, p. 1091.
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general contract law implicitly gives priority to the norms of discrete contracts, with their
focus on the immediate benefits derived by each of the individual contracting parties,
instead of focusing on the underlying cooperation and reciprocity between them. This
is at odds with relational contracts, where the relevant behavioural norms tend to stress
flexibility and reciprocity23 and even sometimes at odds with discrete contracts them-
selves, as the relationship is also of importance to these types of contracts, albeit to a
lesser extent.
This means that any analysis of relational contracts should start by recognizing such
contracts as relational and identifying the relevant behavioural norms that give rise to the
specific relationship between the parties. Such an analysis should aim to establish
whether contract law contributes positively to these relationships or whether it obstructs
them. For this, a more in-depth examination is needed of the various types of behavioural
norms that govern contracting parties’ behaviour in relational contracts.
8.3.3 Contractual Behavioural Norms
The way parties behave during negotiations, when concluding a contract, during perfor-
mance, or when terminating a contract is influenced by whether the contract is more
discrete or more relational, and the behavioural norms stemming from this.24 Focussing
solely on the ‘black and white’ contractual arrangements gives an incomplete image of the
contract. Classical contract law treats every contract as a discrete contract by emphasizing
on discreteness and presentiation, thereby, enhancing behaviour linked to discrete con-
tracts.25 Firstly, the identity of the contracting parties is generally viewed as irrelevant.
Secondly, parties themselves determine a contract’s duration by including a time limit in
the contract. Lastly, few remedies are available to contracting parties wanting to change
or terminate their contract and thus, enhance presentiation.
The RCT, in contrast, insists that the analysis of contracts should start by analysing
the relationships between the contracting parties as governed by behavioural norms,26
rather than by analysing the terms of the contract as governed by contract law, because
this will present a better picture of the contract. Classical contract law, however, still
promotes an analysis focussing on the terms of the contract, which it regards as complete
and closed. This leaves little, if any, room for analysing the circumstances in which the
23 Macneil 1974, supra note 13, p. 761.
24 D. Campbell, ‘Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract’, CDAMS Discussion Paper, March 2004,
p. 16.
25 Macneil 1978, supra note 20, p. 863-864.
26 I.R. Macneil, ‘Reflections on Relational Contract Theory after a Neo-classical Seminar’, in D. Campbell, H.
Collins & J. Wightman (Eds.), Implicit Dimensions of Contract: Discrete, Relational and Network Contracts,
Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland, OR, 2003, p. 210.
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contract is embedded, in other words, for analysing the relationship between the parties
and the interplay of behavioural norms.
Macneil described ten common behavioural norms that influence the behaviour of
contracting parties.27 These are: (1) role integrity, or the behaviour expected of a person
in a given social position; (2) reciprocity, or the idea that contracting parties will receive
benefits from the exchange; (3) implementation of planning, or how things are planned
and structured; (4) effectuation of consent: this derives from the primal root of choice,
where a party chooses and, if necessary, forces the other party to comply with the ex-
change; (5) flexibility: this is at odds with the idea of effecting consent and implementing
planning; (6) contractual solidarity, or the idea of holding the exchange together; (7) the
interests of restitution, reliance, and expectations, which are all based on promises by one
party on which the other party has come to rely; (8) creation of the restraint of power: in
order to have reciprocity and solidarity, and for the exchange to continue, there should be
a balance between the parties; (9) property of means; and (10) harmonization with the
particular matrix.
Discrete behaviour gives rise to discrete legal norms, while relational behaviour should
give rise to relational legal norms.28 These two separate groups of norms are intensifica-
tions of common contract norms, some of which tend to be more discrete, while others
tend to be more relational. The RCT claims that contracting parties’ relationship should
be at the forefront of the analysis, not their legal contract. This is because the behaviour of
contracting parties is guided primarily by behavioural norms, such that it is important
that legal norms should reflect those behavioural norms. Otherwise, there will be a dis-
crepancy between the way parties behave, based on behavioural norms, and the legal
norms of contract law.
A correlation between behavioural norms and contract law norms is particularly im-
portant in the case of relational contracts. Behavioural norms that are relevant for dis-
crete contracts differ from those that are relevant for relational contracts. In long-term
relational contracts, reciprocity, restraint of power, and solidarity are all significant as
they facilitate the continuation of the contract. In relational contracts, the parties have a
greater interest in cooperation and reciprocity because the relationship between the par-
ties is of longer duration and more valuable than the immediate benefits.29 If a long-term
contract is going to last, the parties must be willing to continue to cooperate with each
other. This, in turn, requires the contractual obligations to be balanced: “The more an
exchange system is perceived as wrongly uneven, the more its beneficiaries must depend
27 Id., p. 213. See also M.W. de Hoon, Conflictbeheersing bij opzegging, Boom Juridische uitgevers, The Hague,
2005, p. 101 et seq., for a detailed description of the ten behavioural norms, which she describes as beha-
vioural structures.
28 Macneil 1987, supra note 15, p. 276.
29 Campbell 2004, supra note 24, p. 19.
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on external force to maintain it”.30 Flexibility is also important in such contracts, owing
to the limited potential for full presentiation, especially when a relational contract is of
long duration.
In the case of discrete contracts, by contrast, the effectuation of consent is more im-
portant, more emphasis is placed on the parties pursuing their own benefits, and there is
more competition between the parties. Each party tries to maximize its own benefits from
the contract because the contract is of short duration and the relationship between the
parties is less important to them than the immediate benefit.
8.4 Prenuptial and Tenancy Agreements as Relational Contracts
Parties (to relational contracts) treat their contracts more like marriages than
like one night stands. Obligations grow out of the commitment that they have
made to one another, and the conventions that the trading community estab-
lishes for such commitments; they are not frozen at the initial moment of
commitment, but change as circumstances change; the object of contracting is
not … to allocate risks, but to signify commitment to co-operate. In bad times
the parties are expected to lend one another mutual support, rather than stand-
ing on their rights; each will treat the other’s insistence on literal performance
as willful obstructionism … and the sanction for egregiously bad behavior is
always … refusal to deal again.31
Prenuptial and tenancy agreements in the Dutch legal system fall within the domain of
contract law. Thus, the general rules of contract law, stressing discreteness, apply to both
of them. In the case of tenancy agreements, however, there are certain specific provisions
that are entirely lacking in the case of prenuptial agreements, even though both types of
contracts are highly relational. With this in mind, I now turn to the analysis of such
contracts, particularly their underlying relationships, in order to assess whether Dutch
contract law takes their relational dimension into consideration. I start by describing the
importance of the relationships between the parties to these contracts and then turn to
the contracts themselves and the rules of contract law governing them.
30 I.R. Macneil, as cited in S. Macaulay, ‘Relational Contracts floating on a Sea of Custom? Thoughts about the
Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein’, 94 N.W.U. L. Rev. 2000, p. 776.
31 R.W. Gordon, ‘Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity in Contract Law’, Wis. L. Rev. 1985, p.
569, as cited in D. Kimel, ‘The Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: Reflections on the Relational
Model’, 27 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 2007, p. 236.
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8.4.1 Relationships between Parties and Behavioural Norms
In the Netherlands, the default statutory matrimonial property regime is the universal
community of property.32 All the assets of spouses, acquired before and during marriage,
are part of the community of property. To a certain extent, this legal regime reflects the
nature of the de facto relationships between spouses. Marriage presupposes affective re-
lations, based on a commitment to share life together until death. This can be the reason
why many spouses in the Netherlands choose to follow the default statutory matrimonial
property regime and opt for the universal community of property, for it reflects this bond
and lifelong commitment.
Instead, in the Netherlands, prenuptial agreements are intended to keep the assets of
spouses separated, thereby, avoiding their assets becoming part of a community of prop-
erty. Typically, spouses will opt for prenuptial agreements that exclude any community of
property, with or without a contractual obligation to periodically divide any acquired
gains. If one spouse owns his or her own business or is a lot richer than the other spouse,
that solution might be advisable. However, spouses conclude prenuptial agreements even
if this does not apply to them, for around 20 to 25% of all married couples opt for pre-
nuptial agreements. A prenuptial agreement in the Netherlands consists of a standard
model of the notary, and is brief and not very detailed. A future spouse will normally
not seek individual legal advice and instead will have legal advice together with their
partner by a notary.
A prenuptial agreement is ancillary to marriage and, in the Netherlands, to a regis-
tered partnership, both of which are far more important and more far-reaching relation-
ships between the parties than the prenuptial agreement itself. Being connected by mar-
riage makes the relationship of parties who have signed a prenuptial agreement highly
relational as their matrimonial relationship can also be described as a ‘partnership’. In
other words, they are committed to work together for their mutual benefit, which makes
the spouses less willing to pursue only their own interests, as the interests of the other
spouse are considered to also be the first spouse’s own interest. The relationship between
parties in a prenuptial agreement is – or at least is intended to be – of long duration.
However, their obligations are not clearly defined, as it is not possible to foresee what will
happen during the years to come. In addition, the views and opinions of spouses might
change over time as well, making it troublesome to rely on the prenuptial agreement that
was concluded many years ago. At the moment of entering into a prenuptial agreement,
the future spouses do not usually yet know whether, for example, they will have children,
or buy a house, or how their careers will develop. The parties to such agreements are
interdependent, both emotionally and socio-economically and function as a unity. It is,
32 The law will change in 2018, from which point forwards, the community of property will only consist of
assets acquired by spouses during their marriage.
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therefore, fair to expect the behaviour of spouses to be determined more by the internal
behavioural norms derived from the parties’ internal marital relationship than by exter-
nal contractual or statutory legal norms because, in principle, prenuptial agreements
should be relevant throughout the whole marriage, keeping the assets of spouses sepa-
rated, with the expectation that each spouse looks after his or her own interests, just as
with any other contract. This is also due to people not being adequately informed about
their own legal arrangements or they might have forgotten such legal arrangements,
making it less likely for spouses to have their day-to-day lives influenced by prenuptial
agreements.33 Basically, prenuptial agreements serve to keep the assets of spouses sepa-
rate, yet spouses will be less influenced by them than by non-legal norms during their
marriage when making decisions that could be of relevance to their assets or matrimonial
property.
The parties can be expected to behave as contractual partners in a way that reflects
their affective relationship and to show a readiness to be attentive to the needs and wishes
of the other person, at least as long as the relationship is in a good shape. Translated into
terms of behavioural norms, this means that solidarity, role integrity, and harmonization
with the social matrix will be particularly important for governing their contractual be-
haviour, especially within their own internal social matrix.34 Spouses do not tend to alter
prenuptial agreements after they get married as seeking to renegotiate such an agreement
would be seen as a ‘vote of no confidence’.35 Role integrity means that even though they
are contractual partners, spouses will behave primarily as spouses, rather than strictly in
line with their ‘black and white’ contractual arrangements. Although gradually changing,
traditional gender roles still play a significant role, as husbands are still more often the
breadwinner, while wives are still more likely to be actively involved in bringing up chil-
dren and running the household. The evolving nature of a relationship in such circum-
stances could involve a decision by the wife to sacrifice her career,36 thus making the
spouses even more interdependent and trusting that their relationship will last and not
break down. Other important relational aspects include sexual fidelity, open communica-
tion and honesty, and interdependence – both economically (gender-specific role divi-
sion) and emotionally. These behavioural norms, which emphasize on loving cooperation
and solidarity, create expectations for spouses that might run counter to the arrange-
ments they made in their prenuptial agreements. Moreover, these expectations, in turn,
are not necessarily reflected in the matrimonial property arrangements they make when
they conclude a prenuptial agreement.
33 A.-R. Poortman & M. Mills, ‘Investments in Marriage and Cohabitation: The Role of Legal and Interperso-
nal Commitment’, 72 J. Marriage Family 2012, p. 373.
34 Macneil 1987, supra note 15, p. 287.
35 E.S. Scott, ‘Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage’, 86 Va. L. Rev. 2000, p. 1909.
36 S. Thompson, Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free Choice: Issues of Power in Theory and
Practice, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, OR, 2015, p. 161.
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Relationships between tenants and landlords are admittedly less relational than rela-
tionships between spouses or partners, and can vary depending on how close the coop-
eration is.37 This is, of course, because parties to a residential tenancy agreement do not
have an affective relationship. The relationship itself is also less intense as the tenant only
needs to pay rent on a monthly basis, while the landlord just has to allow the tenant to
live in the house. In the Netherlands, social housing corporations own 71.5% of all rented
housing. This means that the relationship between the parties in a residential tenancy
agreement is even less relational because the landlord in such cases is often an anon-
ymous housing corporation. This is different in the case of residential rented properties
owned by a private person. In those cases, the relationship between the residential tenant
and the landlord is likely to be more relational.
Whatever the situation, tenancy agreements are nevertheless relational because they
are long-term contracts. Therefore, not everything that could happen in their relationship
can be foreseen at the time the parties enter into the contract. The parties to a residential
tenancy agreement are interdependent: the tenant needs housing and the landlord wants
to earn money by renting out his house. Such interdependence increases if, for example,
the tenant has family members living in the house because these family members will
then also depend on the same tenancy agreement for shelter.
Another important aspect of residential tenancy agreements is the existence of a
weaker party. Generally, a residential tenant in the Netherlands is the weaker party be-
cause there has been a structural shortage of housing since World War II, which makes it
more difficult for people to find affordable rental housing than for landlords to find
tenants. Contract law assumes all persons are formally equal, so there would be no weaker
party. However, the government has tried to balance this material inequality by introdu-
cing specific mandatory provisions to curb the contracting parties’ freedom of contract
and, thereby, protect residential tenants. In itself, this fits well with the nature of rela-
tional contracts, especially because it emphasizes solidarity and reciprocity by balancing
the parties’ obligations and also by the restraint of power.
8.4.2 Flexibility in Prenuptial and Tenancy Agreements
Dutch law on tenancy agreements consists largely of mandatory rules that leave little
room for contractual freedom. If a home is classified as ‘social housing’, the rent payable
by tenant is set by mandatory rules, and the parties are not allowed to deviate therefrom.
It is also not easy to unilaterally change the terms of rental agreement. The landlord can
only request the tenant to change the contract if the landlord’s offer is reasonable and
does not involve the amount of rent to be paid. If they do not reach agreement, the
landlord will have to go to court, to get the permission from a judge to change the tenancy
37 Eisenberg, supra note 10, p. 814.
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agreement if and only if the offer of the landlord is reasonable. Importantly, when a
property needs to be renovated (which may occur years after the tenancy agreement is
signed), the law allows the landlord to force the tenant to cooperate. This way, the tenant
also has a relational obligation to cooperate in order to make sure the property gets the
necessary renovation.
Prenuptial agreements are concluded in a different way from tenancy agreements. No
specific form is prescribed for tenancy agreements, whereas, under Article 115, Book 1
DCC, future spouses wanting to conclude a prenuptial agreement have to do so in a
notarial deed. This enhances the discreteness of the contract as it forces the parties to
record all their arrangements in writing at the time they enter into the contract. The
reason for this requirement is the desire for legal certainty. The involvement of a notary
avoids the risk of antedating and ensures that the parties are properly informed about the
relevant law and the consequences of their choices. The downside to this requirement is
that it gives prenuptial agreements a static character and makes it impossible for parties
to amend them informally, given that every amendment has to be in a notarial deed. By
contrast, no form requirements apply to tenancy agreements; even an oral agreement is
valid. The absence of form requirements is necessary in order to protect the tenant.
Otherwise, it would be easy for landlords to bypass the mandatory rules protecting te-
nants by refusing to conclude contracts in writing.
As one assumes that their marital relationship is more important to the spouses than
their contractual relationship, most couples pay little attention to their prenuptial agree-
ment as long as they remain married. For this reason, few couples decide to change their
prenuptial agreement in the course of their marriage. Their relationship will progress and
evolve over the years: children may be born, houses may be bought and sold, and careers
may be made or given up. However, but most prenuptial agreements are never changed
after they have been signed, and so continue to reflect the spouses’ original situation. This
can lead to problems in the case, for example, of prenuptial agreements that include a
total separation of property. If spouses who were economically equal at the time of en-
tering into the prenuptial agreement end up with a traditional role division (in other
words, the husband becomes the main breadwinner and the wife gives up her career to
look after the children), the wife can be seen as the weaker party, at least from a socio-
economic perspective. Unlike in tenancy law, there are no specific provisions aimed at
protecting the weaker party in the law governing prenuptial agreements. Although this is
not usually a matter of concern during the relationship, the wife could face substantial
problems if the relationship breaks down. In the absence of specific provisions under
Dutch law allowing an unfair prenuptial agreement to be set aside or terminated, courts
are reluctant to apply general principles of contract law, such as reasonableness and fair-
ness, to mitigate unfair consequences for the weaker party in such situations.
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8.4.3 Termination of Prenuptial and Tenancy Agreements
The grounds on which a Dutch landlord can terminate a residential tenancy agreement
that has been entered into for an indefinite period of time are strict and are set down in
the law. Firstly, the landlord can terminate the contract if the tenant does not behave as a
good tenant should; for example, if the tenant causes nuisances or does not pay the rent.
If a landlord needs the house for himself and has made provision for this in the contract,
he also has the right to terminate the contract. If no such provision is made in the con-
tract, both parties’ interests have to be assessed by the court responsible for ruling
whether the contract can be terminated. This provision is used more often by private
landlords than by commercial landlords. On the other hand, a housing corporation land-
lord can terminate the contract if it needs to renovate the building. In this way, Dutch
tenancy law takes account of the different types of parties and different types of relation-
ship involved.
In contrast with other contracts, a tenancy agreement does not automatically end
when the tenant dies. A spouse or registered partner automatically becomes party to
the contract by law and so continues the contract. The contract also automatically con-
tinues for a further six months in the case of an unofficial partner who has lived in the
house with the tenant. During this six-month extension period, the unofficial partner can
request to take over the tenancy. This request will be granted if the partners had a shared
household. These rules, which in effect allow a third party to take the contract over,
acknowledge the interdependence of parties to the contract and possible third persons.
Prenuptial agreements, on the other hand, are so intertwined with marriage that they
end at the moment the marriage ends. Given their affective relationship, it is not desirable
to force spouses to continue their marriage and, thereby, their prenuptial agreement
against their will by, for example, denying them the right to a divorce. This applies
even if it runs counter to other relational contracts that stress the importance of contin-
ued cooperation. In this situation, it is the relationship, rather than the prenuptial agree-
ment, that prevails.
8.4.4 Application of Relational Contract Theory to Prenuptial and Tenancy
Agreements
Classical contract law tends to treat all contracts as sales contracts by emphasizing on the
moment when the contract is concluded as the moment when all the parties’ future rights
and obligations are established. However, long-term contracts require more flexibility.
Owing to the relational nature of these contracts, the way in which they are regulated
should take account of the parties’ behaviour. This differs from the behaviour regulated
by short-term contracts as, instead of focusing solely on their own interests, the parties to
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long-term contracts will normally try to cooperate, to be flexible, and to take account of
the other party’s wishes, because preserving the ongoing relationship is of more impor-
tance than the, possibly out-dated, stipulations of the written contract. Comparing the
two long-term contracts – prenuptial agreements and tenancy agreements – shows the
pitfalls of applying general contract law to long-term contracts, and the benefits of mak-
ing specific provisions for such contracts.
One aspect that is important to take into account for the purposes of regulating long-
term agreements is – using the terminology of the RCT – presentiation: in other words,
the possibility for parties to a long-term contract to bring their future needs into the
present at the moment of entering into the contract. Here, Dutch law can be seen to differ
in its approach to regulating the problems related to presentiation. Tenancy law, for ex-
ample, includes specific provisions to deal with the changes that often arise due to the
long duration of tenancy agreements and the impossibility of predicting parties’ future
circumstances. This makes these contracts more flexible and able to be changed during
the term of the agreement.
Prenuptial agreements, by contrast, are treated in Dutch contract law in the same way
as sales contracts, with the result that full presentiation is not possible. The general prin-
ciples of consent, freedom of contract, and pacta sunt servanda apply to prenuptial agree-
ments, which turns such agreements into static agreements, with little if any scope to
redress changed circumstances.38 This can leave parties destitute and force them to re-
solve their problems on the basis of an agreement they entered into before their marriage.
This applies even if, say, they have been married for thirty or forty years, given that few
spouses ‘renegotiate’ their prenuptial agreement, or, if they do, it will be seen as at least a
sign of mistrust.39 The requirement for a prenuptial agreement to be recorded in a notar-
ial deed makes it even less flexible as the parties cannot then make any adjustments to the
agreement without going to a notary, something which rarely occurs in practice. In addi-
tion, couples tend to overestimate the chances that they will not divorce. They tend to see
their future too rosily and are, therefore, unprepared for the consequences of things turn-
ing out differently.40 This, in turn, can have an adverse impact on one of the parties if the
prenuptial agreement provides for a total separation of property and the spouses have a
traditional role division, where the wife is then the weaker party to the contract. This is
partly due to gender roles in our society, where women tend to work less once they have
children and thus become more dependent on their husband.
Another aspect to be considered is the behavioural norms of parties to a long-term
contract, and this is emphasized and explained by the RCT. The importance of these
38 The only exception to this is the requirement for prenuptial agreements to be recorded in a notarial deed.
39 Sanders, supra note 8, p. 334.
40 L.A. Baker & R.E. Emery, ‘When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of
Divorce at the Time of Marriage’, 17 Law Hum. Behav. 1993, p. 446; J.A. Lavner, B.R. Karney & T.N.




norms for the way in which agreements are regulated is acknowledged by the Dutch
legislature in the case of tenancy agreements, unlike in the case of prenuptial agreements.
Specifically, there are already relational elements in the specific provisions of tenancy law
that influence parties’ behaviour and force them to cooperate in order to protect the
weaker party to the contract. Residential tenancy law includes many mandatory provi-
sions aimed at protecting tenants. Landlords are thus forced to take tenants’ needs into
consideration: rent for social housing, for example, is regulated by the state, while res-
idential tenancy agreements can only be terminated in a limited number of situations,
and third parties have a right to take over the tenancy agreement after the death of the
original tenant. On the other hand, Dutch tenancy law also leaves some scope for flex-
ibility as a landlord has the right to unilaterally force a tenant to change the tenancy
agreement. These special provisions show that contract law can allow more attention to
be paid to the relational nature of the contract.
Although Dutch contract law takes no account of behavioural norms in regulating
prenuptial agreements, these norms do dictate the way in which parties behave in such
agreements. The relationship between spouses in a prenuptial agreement is heavily rela-
tional, with a focus on cooperation, flexibility, reciprocity, and solidarity. It is the beha-
viour of the parties that stems from their relationship that regulates their dealings with
each other as spouses are likely to pay little attention to the prenuptial agreement itself,
until the marriage starts falling apart and it will become relevant again. This agreement
will not, therefore, evolve in the same way as their relationship evolves over the course of
their lives. More attention needs to be paid to behaviour than to the ‘black and white’
letter of the contract that the parties signed before they got married. This behaviour
creates expectations, and these expectations should be acknowledged by law, for spouses
ignore or deviate from their own prenuptial agreements. In other words, behavioural
norms should give rise to legal norms and contract law regulating prenuptial agreements
should be amended to take account of and possibly incorporate these insights from RCT.
8.5 Conclusion
Dutch contract law contains three general principles of classical contract law: consent,
freedom of contract, and pacta sunt servanda. Modelled on synallagmatic spot relation-
ships such as sales contracts, the emphasis in contract law is on the moment that parties
enter into the contract. However, the DCC provisions on contract law, which are based
on these principles, are problematic when applied to long-term contracts and, more spe-
cifically, to Life Time Contracts. This chapter argues that a different model is needed for
these types of contracts. The application of RCT, which focuses on the contracting par-
ties’ behaviour during the term of the contract rather than on the ‘black and white’ letter
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of the contract, is more suited as the general contract theory in the case of long-term
contracts.
The conclusion, then, is that, in the case of relational contracts, contract law should
focus primarily on the relationship between the parties and only secondarily on the word-
ing of the relevant contract. A discrete contract is more likely to be a contract in which
the relationship between the parties is of little or no importance. A relational contract, in
contrast, is often a long-term contract in which the relationship between the parties is
vitally important. In the case of long-term relational contracts, the contracting parties are
primarily influenced by behavioural norms and only secondarily by the provisions of
their contract. The expectations that flow from the parties’ behaviour should thus be
acknowledged in law. After examining the application of the RCT to Life Time Contracts
such as tenancy and prenuptial agreements, it can be concluded that Dutch tenancy law is
more in line with the RCT, while Dutch law governing prenuptial agreements is much
less so, and that this leads to problems when applying classical contract law to this latter
type of agreement. The comparison between the way in which these two specific types of
contracts are regulated under Dutch law provides an example of a case (tenancy agree-
ments) in which the law has already been amended to take account of the relational na-
ture of the contract and an example of a case (prenuptial agreements) in which this has
not yet been done, despite such amendment being sorely needed.
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